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Abstract  
Research on Peirce’s phaneroscopy has been done with and through the 
paradigm or the conceptual schema of “Being” — what has been cri-
tiqued by post-structuralist philosophers as the metaphysics of Being. 
Thus, such research is either limited to attempts to define “phaneron,” or 
to identify whether there is a particular and consistent meaning intention 
behind Peirce’s use of this term. Another problematic characteristic with 
such a way of engaging with phaneroscopy is the very anonymity of the 
schema of “Being.” While all scholars admit to the universality of 
“phaneron,” rarely, if ever, do we see an account of how such universal-
ity can be instantiated. In this paper, I attempt to engage with phan-
eroscopy differently. Instead of presenting a better version of what 
phaneroscopy is, or making arguments about what is the case with phan-
eroscopy, both of which are ways of philosophising with “being,” I at-
tempt to enact phaneroscopy. This would mean to undertake to follow 
Peirce’s instructions for the phaneroscopist and report the findings. 
Based on the latter, I shall analogise phaneron with the possibility of 
understanding. Finally, instead of having a conclusion which would im-
ply an intention of making a case, and thus closure, I shall open up the 
                                           
1 The first version of this paper was presented at the “Pragmatism and the Ana-
lytic — Continental Split” conference held at the University of Sheffield in Au-
gust 2017. I would like to thank Professor Shannon Dea, Professor James Wil-
liams, and Dr. Cyril Orji for their constructive feedback which I have incorpo-
rated in this final version. I would also like to thank Rosi Braidotti for her re-
marks on Luce Irigaray, as well as Susan Stuart, Olivier Salazar-Ferrer and Ryan 
J. A. Gemmell whose critical interventions helped me arrive at this final version.  
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possibility of further dialogue by raising some additional questions con-
cerning how phaneroscopy has thus far been represented.  
Keywords: Charles S. Peirce; phaneron; phaneroscopy; pragmatism; 
metaphysics of presence; the Other; Nietzsche; Irigaray; feminism  
1. Introduction  
The vast majority of the research on phaneroscopy, important as it un-
doubtedly is, reveals two problems. First, it interprets “phaneron” through 
the paradigm of “Being” which, according to Peirce, is nominalistic — 
Peirce was against nominalism.2 Thus, such research is either limited to 
attempts to define “phaneron,” or to identify whether there is a particular 
and consistent meaning intention behind Peirce’s use of this term.3 Sec-
ond, while all scholars admit the universality of phaneron, rarely, if ever, 
do we see an account of how such universality can be instantiated.   
In the first part of this paper, I address these issues. In the second 
part, I attempt a different interpretation of “phaneron.” Thinking without 
“Being” does not aim to reach a definition, a conclusion or what the case 
is. If phaneroscopy is released from the orthodox way of thinking about 
what is, what there is, or any other form of what has been referred to as 
the metaphysics of presence,4 then phaneron could be analogised with 
the possibility of understanding. We can justify this analogy by enacting 
what Peirce requests us to do: replicate his experiments, report and 
compare our findings with others. Finally, instead of having a conclu-
sion which would imply an intention of making a case, and thus closure, 
I shall open up the possibility of further dialogue by raising some addi-
tional questions concerning how phaneroscopy has thus far been repre-
sented.  
                                           
2 Two indicative passages where Peirce expresses his feelings concerning the tyr-
anny of nominalism, not only in philosophy but also in everyday life as a way of 
thinking, are CP 4.1 and CP 4.5.   
3 Gary Fuhrman, “Peirce’s Retrospectives on His Phenomenological Quest,” 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 2013, vol. 49, n. 4, 490-508.  
4 See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore: The John Hopskins University Press, 1998). 
76 SOFIA PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 
2. Peirce’s (In)Decision: Indefinite Decision5  
Let us start with Peirce’s much cited definition of phaneroscopy: “Phan-
eroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the 
collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, 
quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not.”6 If we 
ask in whose mind this presence is taking place, where and when, then 
Peirce says “I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having 
entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in 
my mind are present at all times and to all minds.”7 This universality, this 
“phaneron” makes no claim for the kind of being for whom (such) presence 
(it) is; be they blind or of whatever ethnic persuasion, sex(uality), gender, 
age, etc. That means that the phaneron, or the features of the phaneron, must 
be objective or objectively given in the sense that they should be present 
and/or presented to everyone. This is another way of saying that if everyone 
were to describe, to report about what is present in their mind, their reports 
would have some universal features, or would have overlapping points. “In-
deed, he [anyone] must actually repeat my observations for himself, or else 
I shall more utterly fail to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of 
effects of chromatic decoration to a man congenitally blind.”8 We could 
thus say that phaneron is blind to differences.  
Using the possibility of blindness as a starting point for the investi-
gation of the phaneron is critical. This decided indecision allows Peirce to 
look for and look after rather than look at the phaneron as “the collective 
                                           
5 As we shall shortly see, one of the traditional ways of thinking that Peirce ques-
tions, and which he does not allow for the phaneroscopist, is thinking with the 
principle of non-contradiction. To follow such a thinking, we employ linguistic 
schemata and wordplay both of which allow for nuances and possibilities of 
meaning to come forth; meanings which as possibilities would otherwise be left 
concealed and marginalised in the tyranny of Being.     
6 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. I-VIII 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931), CP I.284. Citing from the 
Collected Papers and The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings: 
1867-1893 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), I will be using 
the canonical referencing style (CP and EP) respectively. Referencing with 
pages will refer to various other collections. 
7 Charles Sanders Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce (New York, NY: Do-
ver Publications, 1955), 141.  
8 Ibid., 74-5.  
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total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite re-
gardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not.”9 There are 
certain implications for this. First, we have to dispense of the definite arti-
cle. Phaneron is indefinite with respect to whom “it” is presence for. 
Phaneron is indifferent to our differences be they physiological, psycho-
logical, or historical. However, since we are starting from a particular 
starting point, the particular being of the phaneroscopist that we are, the 
question comes to be how to achieve this universality as phaneron. Phan-
eroscopy “scrutinizes the direct appearances, and endeavours to combine 
minute accuracy with the broadest possible explanation.”10 Thus, the 
question is not what the phaneron is, but how we are to understand the 
universality of phaneron, which must be familiar to everybody. Let us fol-
low Peirce through the principles of phaneroscopy and scrutinise.  
3. Minute Scrutiny    
Following the traditional way of engaging with Peirce’s phaneroscopy 
we shall start with Peirce’s so-called hierarchy of sciences. In this hier-
archy, mathematics is placed as the foundation giving its principles to 
phaneroscopy:  
This classification, which aims to base itself on the principal affinities of the 
objects classified, is concerned not with all possible sciences, nor with so 
many branches of knowledge, but with sciences in their present condition, as 
so many businesses of groups of living men. It borrows its idea from Comte’s 
classification; namely, the idea that one science depends upon another for 
fundamental principles, but does not furnish such principles to that other.11  
First, this hierarchy could not be taken as foundational precisely 
because it reflects the contemporary conditions, i.e., the time of Peirce’s 
writing. If it were to be taken as foundational and immutable, such deci-
sion would clash with Peirce’s strong adherence to the principle of falli-
bility according to which no established and eternal truths exist. For 
Peirce, everything evolves, there is synechism in the world and, thus, 
such a hierarchy cannot be taken as absolutely foundational — it has 
pragmatic rather than ontological value.  
                                           
9 Ibid., 75. 
10 Ibid. 
11 CP I.180; emphases added. 
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Second, the sciences at the time, and to a large extent today, are not 
carried out irrespectively of one’s self-preservation. To occupy oneself 
with the investigation of truth “for some ulterior purpose, such as to make 
money, or to amend his life, or to benefit his fellows, he may be ever so 
much better than a scientific man.”12 Here Peirce’s worries parallel those 
of Plato and Nietzsche with respect to the professionalization of the sci-
ences. To what extent can any science be a business for making a living 
without itself being compromised by that end? “Relatively,” says Peirce, 
“knowledge even of a purely scientific kind has a money value.”13  
Finally, the third reason concerns the idea that a foundational sci-
ence can provide its principles to other sciences without itself being de-
pendent on the other sciences for its own. Now, this is an idea borrowed 
from Comte. Again, it is an idea and not a fact or an absolute truth. But 
is “idea” itself a proper fit for phaneron? Any kind of “idea” is particular 
and thus impertinent for an investigation of phaneron. Peirce writes:  
[P]hilosophers have quite commonly used the word idea in a sense ap-
proaching to that which I give to phaneron. But in various ways they have 
restricted the meaning of it too much to cover my conception (if concep-
tion it can be called), besides giving a psychological connotation to their 
word which I am careful to exclude. The fact that they have the habit of 
saying that “there is no such idea” as this or that, in the very same breath 
in which they definitely describe the phaneron in question, renders their 
term fatally inapt for my purpose.14  
The term “idea” as it is being used is fatally inapt for phaneron. 
We have also seen earlier that phaneron cannot be something definite or 
particular. Thus, no idea will be able to take us to phaneron. No idea is 
pertinent for phaneron, even the idea of “Being” which feels like an 
empty conception — or no thing in particular.15 Every idea is not only 
particular, but a particular habit — and phaneron is exhausted neither in 
an idea nor in a habit. To say “there is” or “there is not” is a habit. 
Thinking with “Being” is therefore a habit.  
For Peirce, thinking or conceiving is an act carried out through signs 
and signs are tools we use in order to perform actions. The habit of speaking 
                                           
12 CP I.45. 
13 CP I.120. 
14 CP I.285. 
15 CP I.53; CP I.548.  
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is a habit of performing an action. This is not just a Humean reiteration that 
thinking relies on a customary association of ideas. This thesis is much 
stronger. It is akin to Nietzsche’s thesis that thought is nothing more or less 
than habits or addictions of doing or making things.16 Does this mean that 
mathematical reasoning is also such a habitual thinking?  
Let us go back to the classification. “Peirce’s classification of the 
sciences stipulates that mathematics is the most fundamental of all sci-
ences for the reason that it is the only one that is completely groundless, 
unsupported by any other science, and independent of worldly experi-
ence.”17 Indeed, Peirce writes that mathematics is rigorous, consistent, 
yet, groundless. But this groundlessness belies irresponsibility. The 
groundlessness and independence is not some ultra-transcendental form 
of the book of the universe. Peirce states explicitly: “Mathematics stud-
ies what is and what is not logically possible, without making itself re-
sponsible for its actual existence.18 It is a tool in the sense that “mathe-
matical reasoning is a logica utens which it develops for itself, and has 
no need of an appeal to a logica docens.19 Mathematics is not a “closed 
book” as some “family of minds” take it to be.20 It is very rigorous and 
consistent because it is utterly ideal. The principles of mathematics are 
not to be deliberated. Once set, everything follows from them objec-
tively irrespectively of idiosyncrasies. Once axioms are set, everything 
follows in one way only. Mathematical thinking is a train of thought. 
But so is man’s reasoning overall, “a train of thought.”21 Just like in the 
case of a railway train, once the tracks for a course are set, there is only 
one way to go. The direction is determined by the tracks, always al-
ready. But how are these tracks, these principles set? Are the principles 
universally obvious? If “phaneron,” as we saw earlier in Peirce’s defini-
tion, refers to “the collective total of all that is, in any way or in any 
sense present to the mind,”22 could they be characterised as phanera?  
                                           
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York, NY: Random House, 1989). 
17 André De Tienne, “Is Phaneroscopy as a Pre-Semiotic Science Possible?” 
Semiotiche, 2:30 2004), 1. 
18 CP I.184. 
19 CP I.417.  
20 CP I.570. 
21 Charles Sanders Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, 54. 
22 CP I.284. 
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Peirce himself writes that his whole work is but a mathematical 
treatise, rigorously following from some basic axioms. But when it 
comes to these axioms, Peirce states “my book will have no instruction 
to impart to anybody. Like a mathematical treatise, it will suggest cer-
tain ideas and certain reasons for holding them true; but then, if you ac-
cept them, it must be because you like my reasons, and the responsibility 
lies with you.”23 The responsibility lies with us. We can either decide to 
accept them or not. And this is also the case for any form of mathemati-
cal reasoning. Peirce seems to be following Berkeley and Erasmus in 
that, when it comes to formulating axiomatic principles, there is no tran-
scendentality involved, but just responsibility:24  
But of late mathematicians have fully agreed that the axioms of geometry 
(as they are wrongly called) are not by any means evidently true. Euclid, 
be it observed, never pretended they were evident; he does not reckon 
them among his κοιναί ἔ ννoιαι [common concepts/concerns], or things 
everybody knows, but among the αἰ τήματα postulates, or things the author 
must beg you to admit, because he is unable to prove them.25  
If the axioms of arithmetic mathematics26 are not by any means 
evidently true, on what grounds do we use them for describing phaneron? 
This seems to leave little room to think phaneron according to arithmetic 
mathematics or the hierarchy. Those things that the author must beg you 
                                           
23 CP I.11. 
24 Or folly; for Erasmus mathematics just like the sciences “crept into the world with 
other the pests of mankind, from the same head from whence all other mischiefs 
spring” [sic]. Desiderius Erasmus, The Praise of Folly (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1913), 63. Berkeley’s admonition, however, is closer to that of Peirce, as we shall 
see. For Berkeley, mathematics, though producing statements with rare clarity and 
consistency according to its own rules and principles, and though “their way of 
deduction from those principles clear and incontestable… there may be certain 
erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and for that 
reason not expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed, throughout the whole 
progress of that science.” George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), 324; emphases added.  
25 CP I.130. 
26 Although this phrase might seem awkward today, still, it is necessary in order to 
remind us that the inceptual meaning of “mathematics” is a way of learning not 
a way of learning only with numbers, that is, arithmetically — see Liddell and 
Scott relevant entry http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/lsj/#eid=66639.  
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to admit reveal an ontological thinking that is not necessarily phaneron. 
Peirce seems to suggest what Agamben calls “two ontologies.” Before 
saying what there is, there seems to be principles which we have tacitly 
allowed as a criterion based on which the “there is” will take place. Before 
the ontology of what there is, there is another ontology of “letting be.”27  
Yet, the most important reason for which Peirce cannot mean tradi-
tional mathematics as a foundation for analysing phaneron is his attitude 
towards the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of excluded 
middle that is derived from it. Setting the principles of any science is an 
event. And for Peirce, as Sandra Rosenthal aptly put it, “the independ-
ently real as a continuum of events is precisely that to which neither the 
law of noncontradiction nor the law of excluded middle is perfectly ap-
plicable.”28 A phaneroscopist “will be sure sooner or later to become en-
tangled in a quarrel with the principle of excluded middle.”29 Mathe-
matical reasoning in the modern sense excludes the middle. We, as 
phaneroscopists, shall quarrel with it, and with logical entailment, we 
shall quarrel with such mathematics.  
Perhaps, Peirce’s mathematics is rigorous and consistent reasoning 
in another sense. Nearly all Peirce scholars talk about the emphasis that 
Peirce puts on logic. But this logic is not the mathematical logic that we 
take today as the valid and proper way of thinking. As Joseph Ransdell 
carefully observes, what we refer today as logic would be classified as 
                                           
27 Girgio Agamben, “What Is a Commandment?” in https://waltendegewalt. 
wordpress.com/2011/04/01/giorgio-agamben-what-is-a-commandment (2011; 
Accessed November 20, 2017).  
28 Sandra Rosenthal, “Peirce’s Pragmatic Account of Perception: Issues and Implications” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Peirce, ed. Cheryl Misak (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 193-213, 206. It is thus very difficult to follow Houser’s and 
Bellucci’s conclusion that there is an isomorphism between experience and arithmetic 
mathematics, i.e., mathematics in the colloquial sense. We could conclude that experi-
ence actualises a mathematical structure with the proviso that we are responsible for this 
actualisation. As Husserl admits in Ideas I, if we had not learnt to count in (particular) 
numbers, it is highly unlikely that the world would reveal itself arithmetically. 
Francesco Bellucci, “Peirce on Phaneroscopical Analysis,” Journal Phänomelogie 
(2015), 56-72. Nathan Houser, “La structure formelle de l’expérience selon Peirce,” 
Études Phénoménologiques (1989), 77-11. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a 
Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (First Book), trans. F. 
Kersten (Hingham, MA: Kluwer, 1983). 
29 CP I.434. 
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logic in the narrow sense in Peirce:30 “There are still other operations of 
the mind to which the name ‘reasoning’ is especially appropriate, al-
though it is not the prevailing habit of speech to call them so.”31 Analo-
gously, this other sense of mathematical reasoning could be the founda-
tion of phaneroscopy but will imply operations of the mind which we do 
not have the prevailing habit of speech to call them so.  
Let mathematics be in the ancient literal semeiosis: the way of 
mathesis, that is learning.32 If we disentangle mathematical reasoning from 
arithmetic, from numbers, which by the way is our creation, then mathesis, 
will be animated by our desire as “the true scientific Eros.”33 Eros is not 
love, but what precedes the materialised/realised question. Peirce calls it the 
first principle of reason: desire to learn.34 The desire to learn starts with 
questioning. Untainted by any authorities, this ἔρως (eros) takes its authen-
tic meaning as a continuous rhythm of questioning (ἔρώ-τησις) which is not 
arhythmetic. It questions the rhythm of life. Numbers, however, are a sys-
tem with a determinate rhythm asynchronous to life:  
Numbers are merely a system of names devised by men for the purpose of 
counting. It is a matter of real fact to say that in a certain room there are 
two persons. It is a matter of fact to say that each person has two eyes. It 
is a matter of fact to say that there are four eyes in the room. But to say 
that if there are two persons and each person has two eyes there will be 
four eyes is not a statement of fact, but a statement about the system of 
numbers which is our own creation.35  
This creation is a technology — devised for a particular purpose. But this 
technology belies particularity: “science of the eye.”36 Mathematical reasoning 
                                           
30 Joseph Ransdell, “Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?” in: http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/ 
menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/PHENOM.HTM (1989) Accessed October 16, 2017. 
31 CP I.608. 
32 See von Fritz and Snell: “B. Snell has shown that μαθεῖ ν and its derivatives 
originally mean a knowledge, a skill, or also an attitude which is acquired by 
training, by being brought up in certain ways, or by practical experiences — as, 
for instance, when a man “learns” to be cautious or even “learns to hate.” Kurt 
von Fritz, “ΝΟΥΣ, ΝΟΕΙΝ, and their Derivatives,” Classical Philology (1945), 
223-242.  
33 CP I.620. 
34 CP I.135. 
35 CP I.149.  
36 CP I.34; emphasis added. 
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as reasoning with numbers is, as all thinking, notational. That is, it is a system 
of names, signs, revealing a logica utens, a tool. And this tool requires eyes and 
hands. Mathematical reasoning with numbers like algebra and geometry are 
indeed powerful instruments — one could even say that it is magical. As Peter 
Skagestad mentions, Peirce has shown how “the specific material quality of a 
sign enables the precise kind of reasoning it makes possible.”37 Any instru-
ment, any tool requires a particular manipulation for a particular end. But this 
particularity is not consistent with the generality of phaneron. If mathematics in 
Peirce’s hierarchy of sciences is to be taken as first which amounts to being 
foundational, then it cannot be the kind of mathematics that is restricted to 
numbers with a particular aim. The aim must be universal.  
Let the mathematics of Peirce be mathematics of desire, responsibil-
ity, and justice. This mathematical reasoning is just as ethics (is). There is 
almost an exact parallelism between them. They bear the same logic; they 
are homo-logous, that is, analogous to each other. One is the counterpart 
of the Other. Two sides of one shield. The “ideals of good logic are truly 
of the same general nature as ideals of fine conduct.”38 Therefore, we 
could take mathematical reasoning as foundational not as applying num-
bers to life to calculate it, but by being rigorous and consistent in the sense 
of an unlimited desire to learn which is represented through responsible 
and just questioning with no particular aim.39 Hence, 
if there are really any such necessary characteristics of mathematical hypothe-
ses as I have just declared in advance that we shall find that there [are], this 
necessity must spring from some truth so broad as to hold not only for the 
universe we know but for every world that poet could create. And this truth 
like every truth must come to us by the way of experience.40  
After all is said and done, “nothing is truer than true poetry.”41 The 
poet is rhythmic mathematician rather than an a-rythmetic one. Peirce 
                                           
37 Peter Skagestad, “Peirce’s Semeiotic Model of the Mind.” In The Cambridge 
Companion to Peirce, ed. Cheryl Misak (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) 241-256, 252. 
38 CP I.333. 
39 Again, Peirce seems to approximate the ancient way of philosophizing which 
did not rely on quantification; see W. J. Verdenius, “Science grecque et science 
moderne,” Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger (1962), 319-336. 
40 CP I.417.   
41 CP I.315. 
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talks about mathematics without numbers: “The common definition, 
among such people as ordinary schoolmasters, still is that mathematics is 
the science of quantity. As this is inevitably understood in English, it 
seems to be a misunderstanding of a definition which may be very old.”42 
Mathematical reasoning is rhythmic; it is just about universal life and ex-
perience. Peirce appears as the first bio-logist — the first scientist of life.  
So far, we have seen that we could not rely on or re-lie with the 
traditional mathematical reasoning to approach the universality of phan-
eron; those elements which Pierce takes to make up phaneron and which 
are present to everyone with no exception. Objectivity is, as Nietzsche 
was claiming during the same period in an untimely manner,43 justice, as 
something common to all. This objectivity is not an object conceived in 
a nominalistic way — it cannot be captured with “is” or “being.” It is 
universal in the sense of being versed by all, uni-versed.  
Therefore, we cannot rely on any hierarchy because any such clas-
sification compromises justice. We need a just classification symphoni-
ous to all, one which brings all together, i.e., one (ac)cording (to) all — 
in all senses of according. Therefore, we need another passage to phan-
eroscopy, an other Peircean passage to follow:  
The student’s great effort is not to be influenced by any tradition, any au-
thority, any reasons for supposing that such and such ought to be the facts, 
or any fancies of any kind, and to confine himself to honest, single minded 
observation of the appearances. The reader, upon his side, must repeat the 
author’s observations for himself, and decide from his own observations 
whether the author’s account of the appearances is correct or not.44 
Let us put into praxis what Peirce recommends. Let us enact and 
then report. 
4. Question and Analogy as the Universal Tools for Phaneroscopy  
Peirce starts with an analogy with chemistry. De Tienne advises to “bear 
in mind the importance of the chemical analogy, which explains why 
Peirce was for a while tempted to call his new science by the name of 
                                           
42 CP IV.231. 
43 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
44 CP I.286. 
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‘phanerochemy.’ It was with the eyes of the trained chemist and mathe-
matician that he wanted to observe the phaneron.”45 We have seen how 
the eyes reveal a particular logic — which, by the way, has been criti-
cised by all pragmatists.46 Let us look for and look at De Tienne’s quota-
tion where Peirce talks about the importance of chemical elements and 
their valences and see how he goes on:  
Why do I seem to see my reader draw back? Does he fear to be compro-
mised by my bias, due to preconceived views? Oh, very well; yes, I do 
bring some convictions to the inquiry. But let us begin by subjecting these 
to criticism, postponing actual observation until all preconceptions are 
disposed of, one way or the other.47 
Peirce never denies that we all have presuppositions and that there 
is no objective presuppositionless way of knowing or doing science. The 
only thing that allows us to reason in an authentic scientific manner is to 
question those presuppositions and preconceptions, even those that we 
are accustomed to think or have been brought up to believe that are de-
finitively true, like 1 + 1 = 2. So, how can we account for the impor-
tance of this analogy? Does Peirce talk at random? 
I fear I may be producing the impression of talking at random. It is that I 
wish the reader to “catch on” to my conception, my point of view; and 
just as one cannot make a man see that a thing is red, or is beautiful, or is 
touching, by describing redness, beauty, or pathos, but can only point to 
something else that is red, beautiful, or pathetic, and say, “Look here too 
for something like that there,” so if the reader has not been in the habit of 
conceiving ideas as I conceive them, I can only cast a sort of dragnet into 
his experience and hope that it may fish up some instance in which he 
shall have had a similar conception.48  
By casting a sort of dragnet in order to find a similar conception, 
an analogy. Peirce questions his habitual ways of thinking and prolifer-
ates analogies.  
                                           
45 André De Tienne, “Is Phaneroscopy as a Pre-Semiotic Science Possible?” 13; 
see also Francesco Bellucci “Peirce on Phaneroscopical Analysis.” 
46 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979).  
47 CP I.289-90. 
48 CP I.217.  
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Thinking, that is using signs, consists in habits of use. It is these 
habits that the questioning disturbs. And this questioning within his 
writing is not reducing the Other in order to try to find them afterwards 
in a particular schema of what is supposed to be there according to what 
he takes it to be the common sense in which they partake. The Other is 
always already there as the possibility of being questioned: Peirce 
writes, and the Other questions through Peirce. The Other is there in the 
form of questioning. The presence of the Other is not felt with the eyes 
of a chemist or a mathematician in the arithmetic way. The Other be-
comes a critical blind eye on the self, he is trying to “duplicate himself 
and observe himself with a critical eye.”49 To allow for phaneron, Peirce 
fallows (his) being critically.50 The constant presence of the blind re-
presentation attests to that. Peirce attempts (to) the blind who pierces 
Charles Sanders’ thinking, the writer with vision, or even perhaps the 
envisioned writer. He creates shocks for himself, he attempts self-
criticism, he is letting tell of his Other:  
Unfortunately, to be cocksure that one is an infallible reasoner is to fur-
nish conclusive evidence either that one does not reason at all, or that one 
reasons very badly, since that deluded state of mind prevents the constant 
self-criticism which is, as we shall see, the very life of reasoning. Con-
gratulations, then, from my heart go out to you, my dear Reader, whom I 
assume to have a sincere desire to learn, not merely the dicta of common 
sense, but what good reasoning, scientifically examined, shall prove to be. 
You are already an unusually good logician.51  
The very life of reasoning is constant self-criticism. Questioning 
and looking for and looking after reasons for rather than looking at rea-
sons that explain in the modern (common) sense. This is another form of 
mathematical reasoning through justice and responsibility in doing jus-
tice to the Other through self-criticism. In the end, “nothing can be more 
                                           
49 CP I.626. 
50 Although “fallow” usually means to leave a piece of land uncultivated or inac-
tive for a certain period of time, we are a using an older sense whereby “fallow” 
means plough in order to sow — see the relevant entry in www.OED.com. Since 
we are trying to follow Peirce in a way that does not mimic the paradigm of Be-
ing, also known as the Metaphysics of Presence, creating relations through all 
rhetorical devices comes to supplement the logic of “logical” argumentation.  
51 CP II.123. 
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precious to a sincere student than frank and sincere objection.”52 The 
scientific spirit is always questioning, “demands reasons” echoing 
Nietzsche, while “the rest demand faith.”53  
Before we proceed, we need to make another observation. Keeping 
the rhythm, the flow of questions coming through, we are compelled to 
see “family resemblances”54 with some feminist reasoning which “con-
tinues to interrogate,”55 to keep questioning itself. Luce Irigaray writes 
one passage according to her point of view, writing (as) woman, just like 
Peirce’s writing (as) a man of vision. A passage is written and immedi-
ately after, another passage comes to pass a question on it as a whole in-
spired by the Other. The order is not of expropriating the Other. The 
Other is not grasped and asphyxiated. The Other is not categorized ac-
cording to what seems evident to oneself. The Other is neither seen nor 
gazed upon, not captured by an eye/I. The Other is not re-garded. It is 
the Other who regards the self. The Other is not looked at, the Other is 
looked for through an extension of (the one of the) self; there is a quest 
for the Other through questioning oneself. This is an extension of one-
self, a quest(ion) towards the Other. It is an effort of resisting oneself in 
being blind toward the Other. It is a move toward the tempo of the 
Other, an attempt to touch their course of experience.56 An “effort — for 
one cannot simply leap outside that discourse — to situate myself at 
borders and to move continuously from the inside to the outside.”57 And 
since the properly Other is missing in writing, it is writing that invites 
the Other as an interlocutor who questions at the borders.58  
                                           
52 CP I.570. 
53 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. R. J. 
Hollingale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 108. 
54 CP I.29. 
55 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn 
Burke (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 119. 
56 When Husserl decides to set phenomenology as the Critique of Knowledge, the 
possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge, it is the Other as 
deaf and blind who come to help him. Edmund Husserl, The Idea of 
Phenomenology, trans. Lee Hardy (Leuven: Kluwer, 1999), 30; 46. 
57 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, 122. 
58 An anastrophe: “to turn back on our path to question ourselves about where we are al-
ready situated.” Luce Irigaray, To Speak Is Never Neutral, trans. Gail Schwab (London: 
Continuum, 2002), 7. This questioning allows for the creation of a new epistemic space, 
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As Margaret Whitford notices, in the writings of Irigaray there is a 
dual purpose; “she wishes to occupy the position of analyst and analy-
sand simultaneously.”59 Just like Peirce who states and questions in or-
der to verify or question a statement further. The quest starts with what 
there is according to one’s logic and continues as a dia-logic, a dialogue 
through questioning. Pierce does not only see(k) to find what the univer-
sal elements of phaneron are, but also, to have them versed by all, uni-
versally.60 To use Merleau-Ponty’s phrase, questioning as we try to 
reach the Other provides a “second openness”61 to the world. At the 
same time that it limits my own view of the world; it enlarges it with 
another possibility — with extra eyes/Is. Without quarrelling with the 
principle of non-contradiction we cannot see how limiting a subjective 
view is at the same time enlarging it. If we keep the schema of what the 
world is, the schema of Being and episteme, which by the way amount 
to the same, the Other fallows my limited schema to allow for an addi-
tion, an enhancement. Only with myself, one I, I can only look at what is 
for me. With questioning myself, I can extend this look by looking for 
the Other, another I. And with the Other present, phaneron comes to be 
the possibility of meaning in an indefinite dialogue with an indefinite 
Other; and its mathematics: questioning.  
                                                                                         
one which includes the otherness of the Other as fundamental for episteme rather than 
reducing or neutralizing the embodiment of the Other as non-important based on 
abstract and/or moralistic rules. See Luce Irigaray, “Perhaps Cultivating Touch Can 
Still Save Us,” SubStance, 40:3, (2011). This “vigilant self-critical process of 
interpretation of our own limitations” in Irigaray is, as Oliver underscores, not sacrifice 
but an “acknowledgement” to the other as Other even in loving relationships. See Kelly 
Oliver, “The Look of Love,” Hypatia (2001), 56-78, at 72, 73.  
59 Margaret Whitford, “Luce Irigaray and the Female: Imaginary: Speaking as a 
Woman,” Radical Philosophy (1986) 3-8, at 8.  
60 This is different from creating an objective phenomenological vocabulary which 
does justice only to a particular set of people as Atkin’s argues. Richard Kenneth 
Atkins, “Toward an Objective Phenomenological Vocabulary: How Seeing a 
Scarlet Red is Like Hearing a Trumpet’s Blare,” Phenom Cogn Sci (2013), 837-
858, at 838. Phaneron, if it is “obvious phenomena” (CP I.127), it must be obvi-
ous to all.    
61 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith 
(New York, NY: Routledge, 1962), 59. 
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5. Questioning Peirce’s Experiments: Testing and Reporting  
Having made these observations, let us follow Peirce and try to find 
those a priori elements of phaneron. Peirce sometimes calls them cate-
gories and, as such, phaneroscopy could be called a “doctrine of catego-
ries.”62 The fundamental a priori features of phaneron according to 
Peirce are the three indecomposable elements that he calls Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness. Peirce uses various words to describe these 
three categories which he hypothesises as the indecomposable elements 
of phaneron. The main cluster for each category is as follows. Firstness: 
feeling, presence, quality, possibility, chance, life. Secondness: (brute) 
fact, reaction, (brute) force, absolute last, haecceity, existence. Third-
ness: thought, law, learning, habit, representation, idea.  
To engage with them we shall report on an experiment that we repeated 
according to his instructions: the door experiment. We put our shoulder 
against the door. There is a two-sided consciousness of resistance and effort. 
This is Secondness, brute fact. However, Secondness is not the above propo-
sition “The brute fact… .” The proposition along with the thought that pre-
cedes it is about (a) brute fact as felt; it is a representation of it, not a re-
presentation of the same. The medium of representation is Thirdness — a 
thought about a brute fact, a representation of it. It is the course itself as (hav-
ing been) felt which is the brute fact; it is what it is, “it just is.”63 The justness, 
the exactitude of fact is past/passed as having been felt. This “is” is force or 
forces (having been) felt as compulsion. “Force is compulsion; and compul-
sion is hic et nunc.”64 Secondness is all about tensed presence. Firstness, then, 
would be the possibility of feeling forces. The possibility of coming into pres-
ence, which is always passed through Thirdness; the ways to represent the just 
passed/past. Secondness is a junction of forces, therefore an event: “The event 
is the existential junction of states (that is, of that which in existence corre-
sponds to a statement about a given subject in representation) whose combi-
nation in one subject would violate the logical law of contradiction.”65  
Let us compare this phaneroscopic report with another one. Atkins 
gives us the example of a perception of a black phone: “When it comes 
                                           
62 Joseph Ransdell, “Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?” 1.  
63 CP I.145. 
64 CP I.212. 
65 CP I.494.  
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to a feeling of some thing, say, my black phone. First, we have a feeling 
of my black phone, namely the black itself. Second, we have the brute 
fact of the black phone. The black phone and I stand in a dyadic rela-
tionship of ego and non-ego.”66 For Atkins qualities like “red” are 
first.67 Let us proceed, as Peirce has advised, that is, by analyzing “the 
phaneron by separating the decomposable from the indecomposable 
elements,”68 i.e., by questioning them.  
Let us start with “the perception of the black phone.” This percep-
tion presupposes vision. Can it be an obvious phenomenon,69 phaneron 
for the blind? No. For the blind there is not a black phone, whereas for a 
person with ocular vision there is. To take color sensations as first fea-
turing phaneron would belie a democratic implicature — to borrow a 
Gricean term — of vision. Atkins’s statement would be true, universal, 
phaneron, only insofar as one starts with the brute fact of the ones who 
see with their eyes; only if the indefinite community of phaneroscopists 
as a community of scientists had eyes like ours. This is neither univer-
salisable nor conformable to minute accuracy.  
Peirce gives numerous examples with color sensations. But he is 
very careful to say that sensation is not “feeling” and, thus, not quality, 
not Firstness. A sensation of blackness is not part of the indecomposable 
elements of phaneron but supersedes it. Sensation is a combination of 
feeling (Firstness) and medium (organ of perception): “That quality is 
dependent upon sense is the great error of the conceptualists.”70 Sensa-
tions are idiosyncratic because they depend on the particularity of each 
sensation. Feeling as part of phaneron cannot be a particular sensation, a 
modality of sense which implies a (prior) classification of sense. “The 
blind man from birth has no such feelings as red, blue, or any other col-
our; and without any body at all, it is probable we should have no feel-
ings at all.”71  
                                           
66 Richard Kenneth Atkins, “Broadening Peirce’s Phaneroscopy: Part One,” The 
Pluralist (2012), 1-29, 13. 
67 Richard Kenneth Atkins, “Direct Inspection and Phaneroscopic Analysis,” 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society (2016), 1-16, 7. 
68 Ibid., 7. 
69 CP I.127. 
70 CP I.422. 
71 CP VII.586. 
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Atkins’s statement that “qualities like red are Firsts”72 is true only if 
the standard of the analysis is the principle of the majority. We could call 
redness a phenomenon in the classical sense, but not an indecomposable 
element of phaneron. Christopher Hookway, for instance, appreciates that 
color perception is neither universalisable nor conformable to minute accu-
racy. He states that “[u]nless we think that all inquirers must possess visual 
apparatus like ours or that they will inevitably encounter creatures that pos-
sess such visual apparatus, […] colour propositions cannot be true and that 
their objects are not real.”73 Phaneroscopically, the black phone can neither 
be black nor phone, nor black phone. Phaneroscopically, there is and there 
is not a black phone on the table. The presuppositions of sensing through 
vision or through particular parts of the body as organs of perception 
linked to distinct senses presuppose distinctions that cannot be universalis-
able, not even prima facie. De Tienne writes that “L’esse du phanéron est 
son percipi […] et le perceptum ne se détache pas du percipiens.”74 Let us 
combine this Berkeleyan thesis, to which Peirce adheres, with the axiom of 
phaneron being present to any mind whatsoever.75 Since there are 
percipientia with no vision, does it not follow that the feeling as Firstness, 
as indecomposable element of phaneron cannot be a color sensation? And 
if one wants to start with color phenomena, would that not mean that color 
must be decomposed based on those who do not sense it?  
In addition, thinking of color sensations as Firstness belies a nomi-
nalistic habit. Peirce says: “If we say ‘The stove is black,’ the stove is 
the substance, from which its blackness has not been differentiated, and 
                                           
72 Richard Kenneth Atkins, “Broadening Peirce’s Phaneroscopy: Part One,” The 
Pluralist (2012), 1-29, 7. 
73 Christopher Hookway, “Truth, Reality, and Convergence,” The Cambridge 
Companion to Peirce, ed. Cheryl Misak (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 127-148, 131.  
74 André De Tienne, “Quand l’apparence (se) fait signe,” Recherches Sémiotiques 
(2000), 95-144, 99. 
75 In Touching Jean-Luc Nancy, Derrida accepts Irigaray’s critique of the senses 
which ends up giving primacy to the sense of touch. He traces this conception to 
Berkeley by reformulating and advancing on his thesis that we are always al-
ready in touch with the world. The distinctions that come from the senses are not 
distinctions based on identity but on distance. And this distance is felt when per-
ception takes a metonymic register by privileging particular parts of the body. 
Bodily-wise, we never get out of touch with the world.  
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the is, while it leaves the substance just as it was seen, explains its con-
fusedness, by the application to it of blackness as a predicate.”76 The 
perception of the phone as that of the stove already includes the color 
quality; it is part of the experience. Peirce seems to be following Berke-
ley again. A substance is the sum total of its qualities. Nominalists (fol-
lowing Aristotle) divide a substance between essential (primary) and ac-
cidental (secondary) qualities through some (techno-logical) medium. 
For instance, John Locke77 used the microscope to arrive at the univer-
sal. But Berkeley said that what we see through the microscope could 
still be said to have phenomenal qualities. What would be the differ-
ence? The microscope or any other kind of medium do not change the 
quality of the percipium, they only enhance the quantity of the quality 
— we still use our eyes. Color is indeed a quality, albeit not a phan-
eroscopic quality. Color quality refers to the experience of those who 
use their eyes to see. In one sense, it is accidental and not essential.78 In 
another sense, the blind sense, it is neither, it simply is not. What it 
would be, where it would “inhere,” would be in the subjective discourse 
of a definite, particular group of scientists who have eyesight. That is, a 
particular sense which implies nominalism through and through.79 Or, to 
analogise with Irigaray, a hom(m)osensual exchange.80   
                                           
76 CP I.548.   
77 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Hazleton: Pennsyl-
vania State University, 2013). 
78 CP I.527 
79 Again, Peirce comes in contact with Nietzsche. For Nietzsche physics “is one 
way of interpretation, an interpretation driven by sensualism. Eyes and fingers 
speak in its favor, visual evidence and palpableness do, too: this strikes an age 
with fundamentally plebeian tastes as fascinating, persuasive, and convincing-
after all, it follows instinctively the canon of truth of eternally popular sensual-
ism. What is clear, what is ‘explained’? Only what can be seen and felt — every 
problem has to be pursued to that point.” Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and 
Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1966), 22. For 
other points of contact between Nietzsche and Peirce, see Ciano Aydin, 
“Beyond Essentialism and Relativism: Nietzsche and Peirce on Reality,” 
Cognitio (2006), 25-47 and Rossella Fabbrichesi, “The Body of the Community: 
Peirce, Royce, and Nietzsche,” European Journal of Pragmatism and American 
Philosophy (2009), 1-10. 
80 In most of her works, Irigaray analyzes the exchanges of the same sex which are 
conditioned on a certain homosexual tendency, and the pleasure derived thereof, 
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Let us go back to what Peirce underscored: “That quality is de-
pendent upon sense is the great error of the conceptualists.”81 Let us ex-
plore this anew. Quality is not dependent upon sense. De Tienne, for in-
stance, agrees that “le phanéron ne se limite pas à ce qui apparait à nos 
sens.”82 But later he takes sensations such as pleasure and pain as inde-
composable elements, thus as feeling. The thesis that feeling is not lim-
ited in sensations goes so far for Peirce as to say that “as for pleasure 
and pain, which Kant and others have represented to be of the essence of 
feeling […] we certainly do not think that unadulterated feeling.”83 And 
he later underscores that “no feeling could be common to all pleasures 
and none to all pains.”84 Feeling is not a sensation “which is entirely 
contained, or superseded, in the actual sensation.”85 Any sensation could 
be a quality of feeling, i.e., the way we qualify our feeling at a particular 
time. However, these qualities are not exhausted in sensations.  
Feeling is not being sensed. Qualities of feeling can be realized in 
ways other than sense. Peirce’s example is telling: “I can imagine a con-
sciousness whose whole life, alike when wide awake and when drowsy 
or dreaming, should consist in nothing at all but a violet colour or a stink 
of rotten cabbage.”86 We can also add feeling pain in the sense of being 
heart broken. When one hears from their partner that their relationship is 
over, nothing is felt in the ear which senses the vibrations of the air. The 
(quality of) feeling which overwhelms the body and becomes untrans-
latable and un-locatable is not a sensation, it does not involve immedi-
ately the functional body. The abysmal pain of heartbreak is not a sensa-
tion but a quality of feeling.87 Whereas qualities can be realised or actu-
                                                                                         
hence hom(m)osexual. Here, we are analogizing this phenomenon with respect 
to knowing as an exchange between people with the same senses, hence 
hom(m)osensual.  
81 CP I.422. 
82 André De Tienne, “Quand l’apparence (se) fait signe,” 98. 
83 CP I.333. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Charles Sanders Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, 81. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Like Wittgenstein’s “impoderable feeling,” where everything is felt in the sense 
of the unusual. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. 
M. Anscombe (Great Britain: Basil Blackwell, 1953). Or, we could use 
Ratcliffe’s expression of “existential feeling.” Matthew Ratcliffe, Feelings of 
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alised as particular bodily sensations, they can also be realised other-
wise:  
for example, this or that red is a feeling; and it is perfectly conceivable 
that a being should have that color for its entire consciousness, throughout 
a lapse of time, and therefore at every instant of that time. But such a be-
ing could never know anything about its own consciousness. It could not 
think anything that is expressible as a proposition.88 
Before something is sensed it can only be a possibility of sense, a 
quality that can be sensed according to the sense for which it becomes a 
sensation. But to say that red is a quality or possibility of sense comes 
after having been affected with similar red and/or other color experi-
ences — otherwise, we could never know anything about it. We could 
not think anything that is expressible as a proposition. Here, we can see 
how Peirce follows Hegel in “a strange costume,” as he avows.89 A 
quality of feeling is what it is not. It has to be resisted somehow in order 
to be able to come into consciousness and thus be spoken about.   
We said that to talk about qualities of feeling comes after creating 
some sort of rupture in feeling. We should explore this further and ob-
serve how it correlates with Peirce’s statement of the “Manifestation of 
Firstness.”90 In this paragraph, Peirce talks about freedom and the “idea 
of” freedom. An idea or a concept includes something having been ne-
gated and represented, whereas in modern logic we trace its meaning 
through an ideal opposite-negative. Peirce underscores: “To love and to 
be loved are regarded as the same concept, and not to love is also to be 
considered as the same concept.”91 We cannot talk about freedom unless 
there is that which resists it. To talk about freedom as Firstness we put 
the negative, the idea in the background “or else we cannot say that the 
Firstness is predominant.”92 Therefore, absolute Firstness is not only 
unthinkable, but, also, it makes no sense — in any sense. 
Absolute Firstness would be a purely monadic state unrelated to 
                                                                                         
Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008).  
88 CP I.310. 
89 CP I.42.  
90 Charles Sanders Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, 79; CP I.302 
91 CP I.294. 
92 Ibid. 
THE OTHER SIDE OF PEIRCE’S PHANEROSCOPY: QUESTIONING AND ANALOGISING PHANERON... 95 
anything else, “a suchness sui generis.”93 If Firstness is freedom and no 
otherness is to be found to negate it, then Firstness is no thing in particu-
lar, thus everything. That is why freedom can only manifest itself in 
unlimited and uncontrolled variety and multiplicity. It is pure positivity as 
measureless variety and multiplicity.94 An object cannot be Firstness as it 
is contained in a relation with a subject. No unity is in Firstness even if it 
is a determinable concept-less and unschematized appearing as a Kantian 
intuition. Unity implies otherness as Secondness. To approximate absolute 
Firstness, Peirce attempts an analogy: it would be like being in a “con-
fused dream,”95 or a pure quality like a state of feeling in a slumberous 
condition.96 An absolute Firstness is sense-less possibility: “For as long as 
things do not act upon one another there is no sense or meaning in saying 
that they have any being, unless it be that they are such in themselves that 
they may perhaps come into relation with others.”97  
Therefore, in talking about freedom some negation is implied — some 
negation of life, of freshness, of freedom, even if it is only in the back-
ground. Such negation can be taken as reaction, resistance or relation, thus 
as Secondness. Not being in any relation is being free. But then Peirce 
qualifies that by saying that “it is not in being separated from qualities that 
Firstness is most predominant, but in being something peculiar and idiosyn-
cratic.”98 Because Peirce talks of the manifestation of Firstness, the latter 
can be construed as non-mediated, i.e., immediate and uninterrupted, non-
negated, non-reacted, unchanging presence. It could be a “manifold” of 
sense without beginning and end: Life. It is not even a Kantian intuition but 
a constant intuiting. Much closer to Nietzsche, this constant intuiting comes 
to be a chaos as a multiplicity of forces as “formless unformulable world of 
the chaos of sensations — another kind of phenomenal world, a kind of 
“unknowable” for us.99 This formless unfomulable is not that there is no 
feeling but that there is no particular feeling. While alive, we are always al-
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97 Charles Sanders Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, 76; emphasis added. 
98 CP I.302. 
99 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will To Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 
NY: Vintage Books, 1968), 307. 
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ready in contact with the world as Berkeley underscored. There is a con-
tinuous contact with the world, an uninterrupted course, and that is the 
course of life: “all that is immediately present to a man is what is in his 
mind in the present instant. His whole life is in the present. But when he 
asks what is the content of the present instant, his question always comes 
too late. The present has gone by, and what remains of it is greatly meta-
morphosed.”100 This uninterrupted course, this chaotic, formless unformu-
lable feeling is not a phaneric flow or, as De Tienne calls it, “courant 
phanéronique”101 or “phanéron vécu.”102 This peculiar and idiosyncratic 
flow is Firstness composing phaneron not phaneron. Phaneron requires the 
question, the instant of “asking.” To describe it poetically, it is the question 
of/as an Other which, like a witch, spells out the present; the question of/as 
an Other opens the door to the present. Let us question again the door ex-
periment. This experiment is conducted in two ways: “Standing on the out-
side of a door that is slightly ajar, you put your hand upon the knob to open 
and enter it. You experience an unseen, silent resistance. You put your 
shoulder against the door and, gathering your forces, put forth a tremendous 
effort.”103 And also 
You get this kind of consciousness in some approach to purity when you put 
your shoulder against a door and try to force it open. You have a sense of re-
sistance and at the same time a sense of effort. There can be no resistance 
without effort; there can be no effort without resistance. They are only two 
ways of describing the same experience. It is a double consciousness.104  
First, we have a hand and then a shoulder. Why change? Obvi-
ously, the hand, the shoulder, the foot, the tongue are all parts of a living 
body. We could push a door left ajar with any of these parts. The univer-
sal is the living body. There is no need to privilege the hand that grasps 
the knob — or a particular masculine part of the body that becomes the 
head of the interpretation. Peirce immediately escapes a possible psy-
choanalytic charge. Neither hand nor fingers; neither grasping a knob 
nor fingering the door. There is another justice here which is sexual. 
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Perhaps, by not privileging any part of the body, Peirce invites women 
in the indefinite community of phaneroscopists as scientists.105 Phan-
eroscopy goes beyond sexual differences because it is living justice: just 
living body and door. (My/Our/Your/His/Her/Any-body’s) living body 
against the door to open it reveals a “two-sided consciousness”106 of ef-
fort and resistance. It does not matter how much the resistance is or how 
much effort is put. The brute fact is that anyone who would be found in 
this experiential setting would agree that the course of the experience is 
the same. Why? Because it is logical. A logic that is not a logic of the 
hand or a logic of the head — or the I/eye. It is a logic of embracing, of 
hugging, of inviting every living body in dialogue. Whereas classical 
phenomenology brackets, phaneroscopy unbrackets. Peirce has pierced 
his vision and now pierces his sex. We could easily say about Peirce 
what Derrida says about Lévinas: Peirce attempts a “masculine point” of 
view but “a point of view that goes blindly (with no view) into this place 
of non-light.”107 And this non-light is the no ledge of the blind and the 
feminine that Peirce does not have but requests, looks for, in order to ar-
rive at the universality of phaneron.108 He asks, quests, looks for by 
questioning himself as the Other that he is not. The no ledge of justice is 
knowledge away from anything particular — beyond being. Peirce’s 
philosophy allows pure science to coincide with pure justice.  
What we have to question now is this two-sidedness. Peirce says that 
effort and resistance are only two ways of describing the same experience. 
This experience of “touching” has come in handy and has been used plenty 
of times to describe consciousness as two-sided in classical phenomenol-
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ogy. But can it do justice to all experience without shouldering life? From 
Husserl all the way to Merleau-Ponty there is a hand “touching and being 
touched” — with the exception of the quest(ion)ing caress of Sartre.109 For 
Husserl, the hand touching and being touched, the two-way directionality of 
consciousness is instantaneous. There is no interval between the hand 
touching and the hand being touched. Merleau-Ponty changes a bit, dis-
places as Derrida put it,110 this Husserlian example. The hand that touches 
passes into a hand being touched depending on the direct(ed)ness of the 
constituting conscious body, its attention. Now, for Peirce, the two-sided 
consciousness seems to lack this passing into since we have a sense of resis-
tance and at the same time a sense of effort. These are supposed to be two 
ways of describing the same phenomenon.  
Let us start with the obvious phenomenon. To talk about it, it is 
obvious that the reversibility from effort to resistance requires thought to 
be represented. While Secondness, it requires reversing, and this rever-
sal is a re-versal that can only be attained by thought as a medium. That 
means, simply, that we are already within the world of representation if 
we reflect on it — even while it is happening. As such, it would be a 
Thirdness in Secondness precisely because the forces are being evalu-
ated, reflected upon during the act.111 The reversal would be a thought 
on feeling and not the unadulterated feeling as being felt in the course of 
its uninterrupted course of action — Firstness. And such reversal cannot 
only be Secondness since Secondness is absolute last. Therefore, if it 
were in any way singled out, that would involve some Thirdness. But to 
what extent is this Thirdness involved? How far does its juris-diction ex-
tend? Does this also mean that the very possibility of feeling the reaction 
requires some kind of Thirdness too?   
Let us inspect two additional reports by Peirce about the change of 
perception. One is about his experience of being “seated calmly in the 
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dark” when “the lights are suddenly turned on”112 and the other is about 
a shadow which turns out to be a snake “while […] putting my mare into 
her stable, in the dusk of the evening.”113 Both are used to describe the 
two-sided consciousness, the polar sense. The shock as Secondness is 
Peirce’s coming into contact with another existence, another force.114 
Existence is manifested in Secondness through shocking resistance upon 
our determination, our will. Something compels us by clashing with us, 
with the course of our life. This interpretation aligns well with the ex-
perience of the blind who get shocked through their stick and uncover 
existence, as Merleau-Ponty explained.115 It is through shocks and vibra-
tions that the extended touch of the blind, analogous to sight provides 
information about what there is. “Secondness, strictly speaking is just 
when and where it takes place and has no other being.”116 What is, there 
and then, for whatever living body is just force: indeterminate, indefinite 
force that compels, that is, shock which surprises. Such compulsion is 
blind, it is a blind force.  
What is left to examine is what Peirce calls “saltus.” If the instant 
has two sides, the polarity that allows it to be connected to the past and 
the future to create a junction, then there is a passage or saltus not as a 
process of change but as change itself, of difference. But for there to be 
a change there must be a possibility of change, a Firstness. The differ-
ence requires “some thing” that allows the passing from the before to the 
after in the sense of connecting them together. The saltus is like a shock, 
some kind of disturbance, an interruption. The question is whether the 
very possibility of this interruption requires Thirdness. Here lies all the 
controversy about whether phaneron includes some kind of representa-
tion as Thirdness or not; whether some sort of Thirdness is involved in 
enabling, in allowing for the two-sided consciousness. Since Thirdness 
or thought is also habit, one could say with the spiritualists, with whom 
Peirce was well acquainted, that only in virtue of a previous habituated 
sense, could a crisis, a shock, a breaking of the habit can occur. This is a 
phaneroscopic observation from Ravaisson: “habit remains for a change 
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which is not longer or is not yet.”117 The question now is how is the very 
first habit constituted?  
Habit, representation, thought or custom fall under Thirdness. This 
Thirdness comes from the Other; the indefinite Other, the community, 
who introduces us into particular ways of thinking and doing. We are in-
troduced into ways of doing things and these ways are the manipulation of 
signs. This is the very meaning of custom. We learn how to think, which 
is a way of doing, based on the culture to which we belong — broadly 
construed. The student who learns axiomatic principles resists them says 
Peirce. They question them.118 But this resistance is overpowered by the 
teachers’ and the parents’ force. Phaneroscopically, we are forced into 
ways of doing. The question comes after some kind of thought, some kind 
of habit is established. Rosenthal writes that “interpretive activity begins 
at the primordial level of the formation of repeatable content which can 
activate habits of anticipation.”119 In a sense, this is true. But the primor-
dial habits are the ways in which we learn as we grow up under the care of 
Others. We are already brought up within recipe of doing things, already 
within a system of meanings, a language-game, a logica utens. In one 
sense, Secondness cannot take place if there is no Thirdness. However, 
that does not mean that Thirdness causes Secondness. Thirdness is this 
“uncommon gift,”120 which the Other gives us.  
6. The (Im)Possibility of Phaneroscopy  
In one of his papers, De Tienne explores the reasons why phan-
eroscopy has not been followed and advanced in the same way as other 
phenomenological approaches. Yet, he claims that the “practice of phan-
eroscopy is thus not separated from truth-reaching activities […]. The de-
scriptive propositions formulated in phaneroscopy are neither true nor false: 
they state what seems, not what is, nor what could be the case.”121 But, as 
we tried to show in this radical hermeneutic of phaneroscopy, the latter does 
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not (make) deal(s) with propositions but with bodies — any-body. Phan-
eroscopy deals with another truth, not just the truth of scientists. Apel de-
fines “truth” in Peirce as the agreement of an “indefinite community of in-
terpretation […] as the transcendental subject of valid cognition.”122 Truth 
comes to be an intersubjective relation manifested in a community “as the 
dialogue of all rational beings” with the possibility “in principle of coming 
to consensus about meaning and truth within the frame of the infinite dia-
logue of the indefinite community of interpretation.”123 A dialogue not only 
about truth, but about the truth of truth as well.  
But how is this consensus or agreement felt, how is it enacted? 
What is its Secondness like? Peirce says that truth “(if there be any 
truth) shall be part of the existential fact and not merely of thought.”124 
Indeed, phaneroscopy is impossible insofar as truth is looked for as a 
transcendental beyond. Phaneroscopy as a quest of understanding cannot 
start without the coming into contact with an indefinite Other in their 
own terms — by questioning. The schema or paradigm of Being, which 
we have been habituated into is, as Irigaray underscores, anonymous.125 
The desire to learn is stifled in this anonymity or is directed towards par-
ticular aims or enacted within particular principles (logica utens) 
wherein pure logica docens (“Critic Greek {kritiké}”126) does not take 
place; questioning as “the great truth of the immanent power of thought 
in the universe is flung away.”127 Truth as phaneron comes to be justice 
and requires the presence of the Other, their embodied existence, not 
their representation. The Other does not only play the role of the princi-
ple of verification, as Apel reads Peirce. The Other is required in order 
to initiate any quest to knowledge. It is the Other who questions for 
knowledge to begin. The only presupposition of phaneroscopy is the 
welcoming of all Other questions: it presupposes a space of expressing 
Otherness in embodied dialogue.  
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